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ABSTRACT
Runtime enforcement mechanisms are an important and well-employed method for
ensuring an execution only exhibits acceptable behavior, as dictated by a security policy.
Wherever interaction occurs between two or more parties that do not completely trust each
other, it is most often the case that a runtime enforcement mechanism is between them in
some form, monitoring the exchange. Considering the ubiquity of such scenarios in the
computing world, there has been an increased effort to build formal models of runtime
monitors that closely capture their capabilities so that their effectiveness can be analysed
more precisely. While models have grown more faithful to their real-life counterparts, is-
sues concerning complexity and manageability (a common concern for software engineers)
of centralized policies remains to be fully addressed. The goal of this thesis is to provide a
principled approach to policy construction that is modular, intuitive, and backed by formal
methods.
This thesis introduces a class of policy combinators adequate for use with runtime en-
forcement policies and analyses a particular instance of them called Static Committee Com-
binators (SCCs). SCCs present a model of policy composition where combinators act as
committees that vote on events passing through the monitor. They were conceptualized
in collaboration with Jay Ligatti and Daniel Lomsak. The general class of combinators
are called Static Decision Combinators (SDCs), which share key features with SCCs such
as allowing combinators to respond with alternative events when polled, in addition to re-
sponding with grants or denials. SDCs treat the base-level policies they compose as black
vi
boxes, which helps decouple the system of combinators from the underlying policy model.
The base policies could be modelled by automata but the combinators would not maintain
their own state, being “static”. This allows them to be easily defined and understood using
truth tables, as well as analysed using logic tools. In addition to an analysis of SDCs and
SCCs, we provide useful examples and a reusable combinator library.
vii
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Runtime enforcement mechanisms are found in most computer systems today, in one
form or another. From browsers to operating systems, firewalls, and email clients— wher-
ever there is interaction between systems a runtime enforcement mechanism is likely to be
found monitoring the exchange. The implementation of a mechanisms also varies depend-
ing on the type of system it is defending. Sometimes it is favorable to in-line the monitor
directly into an untrusted program, where in other cases it is preferable to have a middle-
man that intercepts events between systems. In each case, a system wishes to protect itself
from potentially undesirable actions of an untrusted target and does so by having a security
monitor enforce a policy that specifies acceptable and unacceptable behavior. When the
monitor detects a breach in the policy, it may halt the interaction or try to transform it so
that it becomes acceptable once more [10] [14].
1.1 Related Work
While monitors’ ability to transform invalid traces into valid ones (such as when dis-
playing a dialogue box to confirm an action that would otherwise be disallowed) is not
new, only relatively recently have formal models been devised to capture policies with this
ability. Two notable efforts are edit automata [10] and Mandatory Results Automata [11],
among others [6]. These models define precisely what types of policies they can enforce,
with each having their own advantages and disadvantages. They each provide a principled
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approach to modelling runtime enforcement mechanisms and the policies they enforce, but
we wish to pick up where they left off by providing a principled approach to composing
said policies—one that is founded on formal methods [4].
Another proposed system to provide composability and modularity to runtime enforce-
ment policies is the Polymer language [9]. Polymer is able to specify a rich set of policies
and exhibits universal composability—meaning that decomposed policies retain all of the
expressive power of a single monolithic policy. This further promotes the use of smaller,
more modular combinators that can be reused. The design of Polymer and its specification
of policies is geared toward real-world usage and as a result is less amendable to analysis.
We sacrifice expresivity in our model to gain a simpler, more intuitive composition model.
For access-control policies, there have been a number of systems proposed for deal-
ing with policy composition [7] [2] [3]. A recent and notable system is PBel, a policy-
composition language that is capable of encoding conflicts and “gaps” in policy composi-
tion [3]. Conflicts arrise when there is a conjunction between two policies that disagree and
gaps arrise when a request is irrelevant to a policy. PBel’s basis in logic allows its policies
to be statically analyzed with standard logic tools—a desirable property in a foundational
system. PBel also treats the base building blocks (request predicates) of its policies as
black boxes, which allows implementations to plug in different models without having to
re-engineer a composition framework. PBel is, however, not viable for specifying general
runtime enforcement policies since monitors should be able to insert arbitrary events into
the trace when the policy requires it. Access-control policies only need to respond to re-
quests with grants or denials. Also, encoding conflicts in a setting where there are more
than two responses would not be possible with PBel’s use of Belnap logic.
The system we propose to create policies for runtime enforcement mechanisms in a
composable and modular manner addresses some of the concerns mentioned in these pre-
vious systems. Static Decision Combinators (SDCs), as they are called, provide the frame-
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work for a generic composable layer over base policies, similar to operators in PBel, but
allow policies and combinators to respond with arbitrary events—a necessary feature for
facilitating policies that arbitrarily transform program traces. The model is limited enough
that we can discover the entire space of possible combinators, while still allowing policies
to give an unbounded number of different responses.
In this thesis, we focus on a particular instance of SDCs called Static Committee Com-
binators (SCCs), which carry the analogy of a committee in how they operate. The model
was developed in collaboration with Jay Ligatti and Daniel Lomsak. SCCs vote with a Yes,
No, Abstain, or are marked NotPresent. The committee tallies the votes and casts
a decision. Further more, voters in the committees could be committees themselves, i.e.
subcommittees. With SCCs, the problem of distributed resources that may prevent a proper
vote is also addressed, with the NotPresent vote. We show how these combinators can
be useful through examples and analysis.
1.2 Contributions
This paper introduces and analysis a system for composing policies for runtime enforce-
ment mechanisms in Static Committee Combinators (SCCs), which are a part of a general
class of combinators, Static Decision Combinators (SDCs). Specifically, our contributions
are:
• A model for composing results given by runtime enforcement mechanisms called,
SCCs, and a general class of SDCs.
• A small library of general-purpose and reusable SCCs.
• An analysis of the algebraic properties of SCCs and their use with automated theorem
provers.
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• An analysis of SCC and SDC complexity and how many distinct combinators can be
defined.
1.3 Organization of Thesis
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 describes and formally
defines SDCs and SCCs. Chapter 3 gives various examples of SDCs and their applications.
Chapter 4 explains the algebraic properties of a system where conjunctive and disjunctive
SCCs form a lattice from votes. Chapter 5 analyzes how the size of SCC truth tables
changes with arity and Chapter 6 uses that result to calculate just how many distinct SCCs
exist. We wrap things up in Chapter 7 and illustrate promising extensions to SDCs and
SCCs.
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CHAPTER 2
STATIC DECISION COMBINATORS
This paper focuses on policy combinators—higher-order policies that combine the be-
haviors of other policies—that can be defined using a table or symbolically using formulae.
We henceforth refer to them as Static Decision Combinators (SDCs) and in a particular
case, Static Committee Combinators (SCCs). We study these combinators because they
can express many common combination strategies (e.g. conjunctive combinators), they are
amenable to formal analysis due to their static nature, and the investigation of this combina-
tor class may provide a foundation that can be built upon in order to study more expressive
classes.
2.1 Definition
SDCs are defined within the context of an environment with a set of events E. A
sequence of events from E flow between two entities through a security monitor. The
monitor should at least be able to forward an event, insert a new event, or halt the flow
of events. These decisions form the basis of responses that policies and combinators give.
Policies respond Yes to indicate the event should be forwarded and No to indicate that
the monitor should halt. Policies can also respond with a CounterProposal(e) to
indicate a different event e should be inserted into the sequence. We will often refer to
these responses as votes, which reinforces the analogy used later to describe SCCs. The
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environment includes the set of possible votes as well, with the baseline we’ve established
V = {Y es,No} ∪ CounterProposal(E) as well as any additional “constant” votes.
Definition 1 An environment consists of a possibly countably infinite set of events E and a
set of votes V , V = {Y es,No}∪CounterProposal(E)∪C, where C is a set of additional
constant votes. CounterProposal(E) represents the set of counterproposals, where each
counterproposal vote has a corresponding event from the set E.
SDCs are similar to digital circuits in combinatorial logic in that they are pure functions;
their output is dependent only on the inputs given at a particular moment and not on past
inputs. Because they lack memory, adding events to the trace does not affect their behavior.
They are also general-purpose in that they cannot make decisions based on the content
of a counterproposal. At most, they can discern whether any two proposed events are
equal to each other. In this sense, we say that CounterProposal votes are opaque.
Additionally, for each event they are to vote on, they consult each subpolicy on that same
event and exactly once.
Another distinguishing feature of SDCs are the votes they are capable of producing.
In general, the votes include a number of constants such as Yes, No, or others, and an
unbounded number of CounterProposals that are comprised of system events E. The
domain and co-domain of SDCs is then the union of the set of constants C and the system
event set E, which we signify as V (for “votes”).
How the votes are ultimately interpreted by the system is up to the implementation,
though when receiving a vote of Yes it should be expected that the system executes the
event being voted on, and that upon receiving a CounterProposal the proposed event
should be executed. With SCCs we will see other types of votes with their own expected
interpretations. Whatever interpretations are chosen at the system level, it will not affect
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the behavior of combinators, which simply use the votes from subpolicies to decide on
what vote to cast.
Definition 2 A SDC is a higher-order policy that takes n subpolicies and produces a com-
posite policy with a particular voting function: V1 × · · · × Vn → V
The voting function is what characterizes a particular SDC, and can be defined using a
truth table. An example is provided in the following section on SCCs.
Combinators are composed with subpolicies that themselves could be combinators,
building up a tree recursively until the leaf nodes, which are base policies.
Definition 3 Base policies are treated as black boxes that have a query function with a
domain of the event set E and a co-domain of the vote set E ∪ C, where C is the set of
constants.
Definition 4 A policy tree is defined recursively as either an SDC with policy trees as
subpolicies or a base policy. Policy trees show the internal structure of a composite policy,
unless they are a single base policy.
A base policy can appear multiple times within a policy tree, and when it does it is
assumed that each instance will give an identical vote. Depending on the implementation,
this could mean the policy is queried once and its vote is substituted wherever the policy
appears in the tree, or alternatively that the query function is idempotent throughout the
query process of the tree. We remain as abstract as possible on how the internal workings
of querying works, so long as SDCs remain pure functions operating on votes from their
specified subpolicies.
For each input event e that would be appended to the execution, the policy being en-
forced casts a vote that indicates how the trace should be affected. This vote is the final
result from the combinator at the base of the tree.
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It should also be noted that while composite policies may exhibit this tree structure,
mechanisms need not be separate or distributed. The policies, while possibly defined by
distributed parties, could be collected and enforced in a single mechanism, such as an Inline
Reference Monitor [5] or Program Monitor [9].
2.2 Static Committee Combinators
Static Committee Combinators (SCCs) are a particular flavour of SDCs where com-
bined policies are viewed as committees that vote on proposed system events. A combina-
tor acts as the chair who collects the votes of the members (who may in turn chair their own
sub-committee) and casts the ultimate vote. This is not unlike SDCs in general where the
combinator is the decider, but for SCCs the set of votes and behaviors carry the committee
analogy. The complete set of votes V for SCCs is {Y,N,A,CP (E), NP} described as
follows:
• Yes (Y ): e should be output.
• No (N ): e should not be output. If No is the ultimate vote, execution freezes at this
point because there is no event to be added to the trace.
• Abstain (A): The policy neither opposes nor endorses e. This cannot be the ulti-
mate vote because Abstain does not suggest any way to affect the execution. Pol-
icy designers can use a root policy to interpret Abstain at the topmost level (i.e., a
policy that transforms Abstain into some other vote e.g. Yes or No). Abstain
could be used to indicate conditions such as a policy’s lack of interest in (or knowl-
edge of) e, the absence of a clear majority vote amongst a combinator’s children,
etc.
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• CounterProposal(e) (CP ): Alternative event e′ should be output instead of e.
The ability to emit CounterProposals of arbitrary events are what make these
policies expressive because, unlike truncation-based models, policies can require ex-
ecutions to be modified (i.e., they can edit executions like MRAs).
• NotPresent (NP ): the policy is unavailable or lacks some critical resource nec-
essary for it to vote. NotPresent allows policies to express exceptional circum-
stances and could be emitted by a policy that requires access to an unavailable re-
source or used to signify a communication failure when the elements of the policy
tree are distributed across a network. If NotPresent is the ultimate vote, then ex-
ecution halts (in practice, NotPresent might be an exception that is thrown rather
than a value that is returned). Since policies are not required to be decidable, they
may diverge, which is also represented by NotPresent. In practice it would be
difficult to determine for what reason a policy a policy is unreachable. Following the
committee analogy, a divergent policy could be seen as a filibuster.
We believe that the above list of outcomes is complete. Each voter is either present or not
(NotPresent). If present, each voter can vote or not. A voter can not vote by explicitly
refusing (Abstain) or by never casting a vote (⊥). Voters can vote yes, no, or propose a
completely different event to output.
2.3 Specifying SDCs
As functions, combinators could be defined using standard mathematical notation. For
instance, an if-then-else-style combinator could be defined as a function:
A(p1, p2, p3) =

p2 if p1 = Y
p3 otherwise
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The behavior is clear from the definition, though as with functions of boolean or multi-
valued logic, it can be helpful to define them using truth tables and formulae.
2.3.1 Combinators as Tables
All SDCs can be formulated as truth tables in which the output of the SDC is de-
termined by the outputs of its subpolicies. The ability of committee policies to output
counterproposals complicates the representation and reasoning about them compared to
functions in a straightforward multi-valued logic. This complication arises because a sys-
tem may have infinitely many events and each counterproposal is parametrized over an
event. Therefore, there are potentially an infinite number of unique counterproposals that a
policy can vote with.
Infinitely large tables are not required because SDCs do not have any knowledge of
particular events and so counterproposed events can be represented abstractly using event
variables. However, SDCs can determine if two events are equal without any special knowl-
edge. Thus, in cases where more than one subpolicy outputs a counterproposal, an SDCs
can cast a different vote for each combination of equality relationships amongst the coun-
terproposed events. Event variables are used to label counterproposals such that the equiv-
alence relationships amongst the variable identifiers signifies the equivalence relationships
amongst the events they represent. Table 2.1 illustrates the definition of a ternary combina-
tor called ITE (if-then-else) that uses p1 as the predicate such that ITE votes like p2 when
p1 votes Y and otherwise votes like p3.
2.3.2 Combinators as Formulae
Combinators can be defined as a function or in terms of other combinators with operator
symbols.
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Table 2.1. A partial table representation of an if-then-else-style combinator that illustrates
details about how the permutations of subpolicy votes are listed.
p1 p2 p3 ITE(p1, p2, p3) Comments
N Y A A p1 does not vote Y , so ITE votes the same as p3
Y NP CP1 NP p1 votes Y , so ITE votes the same as p2
CP1 CP1 CP1 CP1 p1 is not Y , so vote p3. All subpolicies vote the
same counterproposal.
CP1 CP2 CP1 CP1 p1 is not Y , so vote p3. p1 and p3 vote the same
counterproposal; p2, a distinct counterproposal.
CP1 CP2 CP3 CP3 p1 is not Y , so vote p3. All subpolicies vote
counterproposals, each of them distinct events.
...
...
...
...
...
If combinators have been defined and given operator symbols, we can define new com-
binators in terms of those symbols. For example, say we have conjunction and disjunction
combinators with operators ∧ and ∨ respectively. We can define a new ternary combinator
as C = p1∧ (p2∨ p3). A visual representation of this combinator would, infact, be a policy
tree.
p2 p3
p1
Figure 2.1. The policy tree of a combinator defined using the formula: p1 ∧ (p2 ∨ p3).
In order to verify the behavior of the formula one could write out the results, including
sub-formulae, in a truth table as is often seen in boolean logic. We will see more examples
of this in Chapter 3.
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CHAPTER 3
EXAMPLES
This chapter demonstrates different types of policies SCCs can implement and how
they can be constructed in a modular fashion.
3.1 Access Control
We can imagine a scenario where there are two users on a system, Alice and Bob, who
have access to a resource, R, but only one user may access the resource at a time. Instead of
specifying the requirements as a single policy, we can create a composite of three policies
using a ternary SCC. We will refer to this policy as ACP for Access-Control Policy.
The first policy decides whether Alice is allowed to access resource R. If the action
being voted on is in fact Alice accessing resource R, the policy returns Yes. If it is some
other action, the policy returns abstain. The second policy is for Bob and behaves
analogously, allowing Bob to access R or otherwise abstaining.
The third policy specifies that only 1 user is allowed to access resource R. If no user
is currently accessing R and either Alice or Bob attempts to, the policy will vote Yes.
However, if a user is currently accessing R when another attempt is made, the policy will
vote No. If the action is not an access on R, the policy will abstain from voting. This policy
will use some means to maintain its security state, though this is outside the concern of the
combinators.
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It is conceivable that the third policy could propose some other action to take if the
resource is busy by returning a CounterProposal. The SCC could account for this
and return the CounterProposal instead of No, but for the purposes of demonstrating
access control this example sticks with No.
3.1.1 Combinator Definition
The three subpolicies p1, p2, and p3 are combined using a ternary SCC that produces the
desired policy specification. The composite policy should abstain when all three subpoli-
cies abstain, and permit the action when either p1 or p2 return Yes and p3 returns Yes. The
policy should otherwise return No to indicate the access has failed. A truth table description
of the SCC shows exactly which inputs provide which output.
Table 3.1. The abridged truth table for the ACP combinator with the three policies defined
above. It shows outcomes where Alice or Bob may not have access to the resource in
addition to our hypothesized scenario where they do. We also show cases where a policy
returns NP, indicating some failure occurred preventing the subpolicy from formulating a
proper vote. Inputs that cannot occur, such as p1 being CP1, are omitted from the table to
simplify. If p1 did emit those values, the table would be incomplete without rows for those
inputs.
p1 p2 p3 ACP (p1, p2, p3)
N NP Y N
N A Y N
NP N Y N
NP NP Y N
NP Y Y Y
NP A Y N
Y NP Y Y
Y A Y Y
A N Y N
A NP Y N
A Y Y Y
A A A A
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The composite policy exhibits the desired behavior we expected, and we are able to
modify the policy by simple switching one of its subpolicies with a different one without
modifying the SCC. For example, we could change the policy to deny Bob access to the
resource by changing p2.
3.1.2 Combinator Decomposition
SCCs can often be decomposed into more modular and general SCCs that would likely
be found in a combinator library for distribution and reuse. This particular access-control
policy can be decomposed using only a conjunctive binary SCC (signified with the ∧ oper-
ator). To emulate the behavior of the ternary SCC, the conjunction can operate on p1 and p2
to determine whether one of them permits the action or whether both abstain, then another
can operate on the result of the first and whether the resource is available (the vote of p3).
p1 p2
p3
Figure 3.1. Decomposed ACP that uses two binary conjunction SCCs.
Intuitively it may seem the conjunction between p1 and p2 should rather be a disjunc-
tion, asking whether Alice or Bob is permitted to access the resource. Conjunction works
in this instance because only the policy concerned with the user initiating the action will
vote, rather than abstain, and a typical interpretation of policy conjunction is to take the
most restrictive result, and a vote (any vote) is more restrictive than abstention. If a policy
abstains from voting and another produces a vote, it is reasonable to expect the conjunc-
tion to follow the policy that voted, which achieves the desired behavior of voting Yes
whenever p1 or p2 vote Yes. If both abstain, their conjunction will also abstain.
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The second conjunction operates on the result of the first conjunction (which deter-
mined if the user was authorized to access the resource) and p3 (which determines if the
resource is still available). Since our definition of conjunction returns the most restrictive
vote, and No is more restrictive than Yes, it is straightforward to show that the composed
policy will deny the access if p3 returns NotPresent and permit it if p3 returns Yes,
just as the original ternary SCC would. If p3 abstains, the action was not a resource access
and the other subpolicies will have abstained also, resulting in each conjunction and the
composite policy producing an abstain.
Table 3.2. The complete definition of a conjunction SCC that favors the more restrictive
operand.
∧ N NP CP1 CP2 Y A
N N N N N N N
NP N NP NP NP NP NP
CP1 N NP CP1 NP CP1 CP1
Y N NP CP1 CP2 Y Y
A N NP CP1 CP2 Y A
We have shown that it is possible to build a policy tree with the same behavior as a cus-
tom designed ternary SCC by using a generic conjunction SCC, increasing the modularity
of policy composition and reuse of combinator parts.
Table 3.3. In the decomposed ACP, an intermediary result is computed between p1 and p2
before finding the final result by conjoining it with p3. Notice that the results in the final
column match the entries of the final column in Table 3.1 of the ACP combinator.
p1 p2 p3 p1 ∧ p2 (p1 ∧ p2) ∧ p3
N A N N N
N A Y N N
Y A N Y N
Y A Y Y Y
A N N N N
A N Y N N
A Y N Y N
A Y Y Y Y
A A A A A
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3.2 Quorums and Majority
SCCs can also be used to build policies that return arbitrary actions to the system.
3.2.1 The Quorum Combinator
The next example is of an SCC that enforces a quorum, a relevant concept for commit-
tees engaged in decision making. If the quorum (the minimum number of participants that
must be present to vote) is not met, the SCC votes No. At a high level, there is a conjunc-
tion between an SCC that checks if the quorum has been met, returning No if the quorum
has not been met and abstain if it has, and the original SCC, which is composed of a
number subpolicies.
Original
SCC
p1 p2 p3
Quorum
Check
p1 p2 p3
Figure 3.2. High-level organization of a ternary quorum combinator.
At a lower level the quorum combinator checks each quorum-sized combination of
subpolicies to make sure that at least one such combination has no subpolicies returning
NotPresent. For example, if a policy has three subpolicies and the quorum is set to
2, the combinations of subpolicies would be {(p1, p2), (p1, p3), (p2, p3)}. If none of these
combinations have all subpolicies present, then the quorum has not been met. In order to
check the votes of subpolicies, we can define a new inequality SCC, symbolized with 6=.
In addition to inequality, we define a disjunction SCC (∨) that can be used to ensure that at
least one combination meets the quorum.
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Table 3.4. Inequality and disjunction SCCs utilized by the quorum combinator. The in-
equality combinator is used to check that subpolicies’ votes are not equal to NotPresent,
and the disjunction SCC is used to ensure that at least one combination of subpolicies meets
the quorum.
6= N NP CP1 CP2 Y A
N N A A A A A
NP A N A A A A
CP1 A A N A A A
Y A A A A N A
A A A A A A N
∨ N NP CP1 CP2 Y A
N N NP CP1 CP2 Y A
NP NP NP CP1 CP2 Y A
CP1 CP1 CP1 CP1 Y Y A
Y Y Y Y Y Y A
A A A A A A A
The checks of each quorum-sized combination are merged together (using disjunction)
into a policy tree that returns Abstain if at least one of the combinations of subpolicies
meet the quorum and No otherwise.
The policy tree that forms the quorum-checking policy is then conjoined with the orig-
inal SCC so that if the quorum is reached, the original vote is cast, or else N is cast. The
exact construction of the quorum combinator depends on the arity of the original SCC and
the value chosen for quorum, though the pattern should be simple enough generate the de-
signed combinator using tools. Figure 3.3 displays a ternary SCC labeled “Original SCC”
composed with a quorum-check that enforces a quorum of two.
p1 NP p2 NP
p1 NP p3 NP p2 NP p3 NP
Original
SCC
p1 p2 p3
Figure 3.3. Low level construction of a ternary quorum combinator.
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3.2.2 The Majority Combinator
Another useful type of SCC is one that always returns the majority vote. As with the
quorum combinator, the low level construction of such a combinator will depend on its
arity (n). A way to construct the majority combinator is to check each combination of
subpolicies (where the number of subpolicies in each combination is equal to dn/2e) and
if the subpolicies cast the same vote, return that vote, or else vote No. For the ternary case,
the combinations of subpolicies would be {(p1, p2), (p1, p3), (p2, p3)}, so we can check for
a majority by seeing if any of these pairs gives the same value. To compare votes, we’ll
assume we have an equality SCC (=) that is the dual of 6=, returning Abstain when they
are equal and No when they are not.
p1 p2
p1
p1 p3
p1
p2 p3
p2
Figure 3.4. Construction of a ternary majority combinator.
Since = will return Abstain if both operands are equal and Abstain conjoined with
any other vote gives that other vote, the conjunction (p1 = p2) ∧ p1 will return p1 when
p1 casts the same vote as p2, which will give the majority vote. If the second operand of
the conjunction was p2 it would work the same, since all subpolicies would have the same
value if they’re equal. The choice of which policy’s vote will be returned is arbitrary. If the
equality check fails for each combination, the disjunction of them all will return N .
For arities greater than 3, the complexity of the low-level construction increases greatly.
With an arity of 4, for instance, a majority could be a combination of 2 or 3 subpolicies,
18
so combinations of each size would need to be checked – first for majorities of 3, then for
2. For combinations that are less than or equal to half the arity in size, such as 2 when the
arity is 4, there could be ties for majority. A special disjunction may need to be created
to deal with ties. Alternatively, a custom n-ary SCC could be created instead of trying to
decompose it into generic SCCs.
The majority combinator has a potential undesirable behavior when the majority of
subpolicies return NotPresent. If NotPresent is considered an undesirable majority
vote, the policy author could use a Quorum Combinator to ensure there are enough sub-
policies present to reach a majority. If there are not enough subpolicies for a majority, then
it votes No. Figure 3.5 shows how the quorum and majority combinators can be combined,
with the majority combinator replacing the place holder policy labelled “Original SCC” in
the figure showing the quorum combinator, Figure 3.3.
p1 NP p2 NP
p1 NP p3 NP p2 NP p3 NP
p1 p2
p1
p1 p3
p1
p2 p3
p2
Figure 3.5. A complete ternary majority-quorum SCC.
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This combinator will produce the majority vote of its subpolicies, unless there was no
majority or the quorum of 2 was not met.
3.3 More General Purpose SCCs
The conjunction, disjunction, equality, and inequality combinators that have been in-
troduce in previous examples (Tables 3.2 and 3.4) can be used to create additional general
purpose combinators.
3.3.1 If-then-else Combinator
Another useful, general purpose SCC is the if-then-else combinator. This combinator is
ternary: the first subpolicy acts as a condition, which, if it votes Abstain or Yes, means
the combinator will cast the vote of its second subpolicy, otherwise it will cast the vote of
its third subpolicy (full definition in Figure A.5). The policy can be defined in terms of ∨,
∧, and =:
ITE(p1, p2, p3) = ((p1 = A ∨ p1 = Y ) ∧ p2) ∨ ((p1 6= A ∧ p1 6= Y ) ∧ p3)
Key to the decomposition of this combinator is that at least one side of the disjunction
will always be No, which means the vote from the other side will be favored in a disjunction.
This is because (p1 = A ∨ p1 = Y ) ∧ p2) will produce an Abstain precisely when
(p1 6= A ∨ p1 6= Y ) produces a No, and vice-versa. When the dual equality checks are
conjoined with their respective subpolicies, one will produce the vote of the policy and the
other will produce a No (recall that conjunction with Abstain returns the other operand,
and conjunction with No returns No).
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By reusing our basic combinators we are able to achieve the desired behavior of an
if-then-else combinator, which could be used to define other generic combinators. For
example, we could define a binary try-with combinator as TRY (p1, p2) = ITE(p1 =
Y, p1, p2).
3.3.2 Try-with Combinator
This combinator votes Yes if the first policy does, otherwise it casts the vote of p2. Of
note in the definition TRY (p1, p2) = ITE(p1 = Y, p1, p2) is how a formula was supplied
as an argument to the ITE combinator, which works because formulae represent composite
policies. This nested approach can be used to express chains of combinations, forming
higher-arity policy trees. For example, here is a series of nested try-withs that form a 5-ary
policy:
TRY (p1, TRY (p2, TRY (p3, TRY (p4, p5))))
This chain of try-withs forms a policy that will cast Yes if any of the first four policies
do, or else it will cast the vote of the last policy, p5. This technique could be used with
if-then-else as well for even more intricate behavior.
3.3.2.1 Alternate Definition
The previous definition of try-with using the ITE combinator would fully expand to:
(((p1 = Y ) = A ∨ (p1 = Y ) = Y ) ∧ p1) ∨ (((p1 = Y ) 6= A ∧ (p1 = Y ) 6= Y ) ∧ p2)
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Some parts of the formula are extraneous— unessential to achieving the behavior of
try-with. A more direct, simplified version would be:
TRY (p1, p2) = ((p1 = Y ) ∧ p1) ∨ ((p1 6= Y ) ∧ p2)
The formula can be decomposed and each part listed in a truth table to show the behav-
ior of the formula still matches the desired behavior. The decomposition is given in Table
3.5.
Table 3.5. In the table, the v variable represents any vote in V . The try-with formula has
a disjunction of the two sub-formulae in columns 3 and 5. By inspecting the columns, we
can see there is either a disjunction of N ∨ v, which always gives v, and Y ∨ N , which
gives Y , and that Y is only the result when p1 = Y and in all other cases it is v, giving us
the desired behavior.
p1 p2 p1 = Y (p1 = Y ) ∧ p1 p1 6= Y (p1 6= Y ) ∧ p2 TRY (p1, p2)
N v N N A v v
NP v N N A v v
CP1 v N N A v v
Y v A Y N N Y
A v N N A v v
3.3.3 Dominates Combinator
This SCC should return whatever value the first subpolicy proposes, otherwise it will
return the value of the second subpolicy. In this case, there are two votes we will consider
“non-votes”: Abstain and NotPresent. In such cases, we will defer the decision of
what to vote to the second subpolicy. We can formulate the policy as:
DOM(p1, p2) = ((p1 6= A ∨ p1 6= NP ) ∧ p1) ∨ ((p1 = A ∨ p1 = NP ) ∧ p2)
This policy uses the same technique as if-then-else and try-with, using a disjunction of
a comparison and its negation, so that only one side will produce a non No vote.
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CHAPTER 4
ALGEBRAIC PROPERTIES
Combinators that exhibit certain algebraic properties are useful for policy writers when
designing policy trees and also for performing static analysis using automated theorem
provers.
4.1 Lattice Structure
Lattices are a basic algebraic structure that have a useful dual interpretation relating
to order theory—both interpretations become useful for reasoning about votes and their
combinations. In regards to order theory, we can consider some votes as potentially more
impactful on the monitor’s trace than others and establish an ordering relation among them
based on observation. As an algebraic structure, a lattice includes operations with algebraic
properties such as commutativity, associativity, and others, which are vital for analysis.
4.1.1 Partial Ordering of Votes
An ordering of votes based on their potential to impact the trace provides guidance
on what their combinations should produce. Intuitively, a conjunction between a high
impact vote and a low impact vote should favor the higher impact vote, while the op-
posite is true for disjunction. For SCCs, Abstain has the least impact since it will
not affect the trace or influence the vote of another policy when conjoined. A vote of
Yes has more potential for impact as it means the policy actively wishes to preserve the
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trace. CounterProposals will alter the trace, so have move potential for impact than
Abstain or Yes. NotPresent is less restrictive than No as it is not an outright denial,
but is more restrictive than Yes and Abstain since it could have potentially been a de-
nial. CounterProposals are in the middle, with a restrictiveness somewhere between
granting and denying, or possibly denying. CounterProposals are also not compara-
ble to each other in this ordering because thier semantics, and thus their restrictiveness, is
opaque to the combinator.
Using the restrictiveness ordering, we can arrive at the lattice structure in Figure 4.1.
Y
CP1 CP2
NP
A
CP3 ...
N
Figure 4.1. A partial ordering of SCC values based on restrictiveness.
4.1.2 Lattice Axioms
The conjunctive and disjunctive combinators introduced in the previous chapter (shown
in Tables 3.2 and 3.4) are based on the same restrictiveness ordering. They form the meet
and join operations, respectively, two operations that characterize lattices. Given a lattice
structure, such as the one for SCCs ({A, Y,NP,N,CP1, ...},∧,∨), there are a number of
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axiomatic identities that hold for conjunction and disjunction over all latice elements x, y,
z:
x ∨ y = y ∨ x (commutativity)
x ∧ y = y ∧ x (commutativity)
x ∨ (y ∨ z) = (y ∨ x) ∨ z (associativity)
x ∧ (y ∧ z) = (y ∧ x) ∧ z (associativity)
x ∨ (x ∧ y) = x (absorption)
x ∧ (x ∨ y) = x (absorption)
x ∨ x = x (idempotency)
x ∧ x = x (idempotency)
Idempotency can be derived from absorption, so it is not usually included as an axiom—
we include it here because it is a notable property and the derivation is not immediately
obvious. By setting y = x ∧ z, the absorption property becomes x ∧ (x ∨ (x ∧ z)) = x,
which simplifies to x ∧ x = x.
From these axioms, which all lattices share, one can define a less-than-or-equal relation,
≤, that gives the elements of the lattice a partial ordering:
x ≤ y ⇐⇒ x ∧ y = x (less-than-or-equal)
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For convenience, we also define a less-than relation <:
x < y ⇐⇒ x ≤ y and x 6= y (less-than)
Additional axioms are necessary to produce the lattice of votes shown in Figure 4.1:
x ∨N = x (join identity)
x ∧ A = x (meet identity)
N < NP (NP element)
N < x⇒ NP ≤ x (NP is atomic)
Y < A (Y element)
x < A⇒ x ≤ Y (Y is coatomic)
CP (x) ⇐⇒ ¬(x = Y or x = NP or x = A or x = N) (counterproposal)
(CP (x) and CP (y) and x 6= y)⇒ (x ∧ y = NP and x ∨ y = Y )
(counterproposal non-comparable)
The join and meet identity establish bounds on the lattice, with N being the least ele-
ment and A being that greatest element. An atomic element is one that covers the least ele-
ment, meaning that it is less than all other elements besides the least element. The coatomic
element is the dual concept. The predicate CP (x) indicates that votes are counterproposals
if and only if they are not one of the constants. The counterproposal non-comparable ax-
iom establishes the diamond shape in the middle of the lattice since the join and meet of
any distinct counterproposals is always above and below.
From these properties we can see that conjunction and disjunction for SCCs work sim-
ilar to how they do for Boolean and other logics. Commutativity for SCCs guarantees that
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the order of subpolicies does not affect the outcome, while associativity means that, in a
homogeneous tree of SCCs, the hierarchy also will not affect the outcome.
A noticeable property that SCCs lack is distributivity. We will see that this is common
of SDCs based on a lattice structure.
4.1.3 Distributivity
Distributivity is a necessary property for a number of algebraic structures, namely
groups, distributive lattices, and Boolean algebras. In order for distributivity to hold, the
following laws must hold for all elements a, b, c:
a ∨ (b ∧ c) = (a ∨ b) ∧ (a ∨ c)
a ∧ (b ∨ c) = (a ∧ b) ∨ (a ∧ c)
The laws break down for SCCs when all elements are CounterProposals:
CP1 ∧ (CP2 ∨ CP3) = (CP1 ∧ CP2) ∨ (CP1 ∧ CP3)
CP1 ∧ Y = NP ∨NP
CP1 = NP
In general, any lattice that contains a diamond or a pentagon shape (as shown in Figure
4.2 cannot be distributive ([16] Theorem 1.2.1), and a diamond shape can clearly be seen
in Figure 4.1 between Y , NP , and the counterproposals. Any SDCs that use a similar or-
dering and have at least three distinct CounterProposals, enough to form a diamond,
will also have this limitation.
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Figure 4.2. A distributive lattice cannot have a diamond and pentagon as a sublattice. A
modular lattice cannot have a pentagon as a sublattice.
4.1.3.1 Distributive Elements
While general distributivity may not be possible, we can consider if certain elements
have this useful property, which would allow policies to be written as if it were true if the
conditions are right.
An element d is said to be distributive ([16] page 76) if d∨ (x∧ y) = (d∨ x)∧ (d∨ y)
holds for all x, y in the set of lattice elements.
For the SCC lattice, CounterProposals are the only non-distributive elements.
4.2 Negation
A negation combinator is useful for building composite policies such as 6= from =. In
the table for the negation SCC, every element has a dual except for CounterProposals,
which return themselves. This shows that negations does not produce complements in
general (an element x has a complement iff x ∨ ¬x = 1 and x ∧ ¬x = 0).
Interestingly, even though De Morgan’s law ( (x ∧ y) = x ∨ y) pertains to elements
and their complements, the formula holds using our meet, join, and negation operations. A
De Morgan algebra is defined as a bounded distributive lattice with a unary operator such
that [8]:
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Table 4.1. Each element has a dual element, except for CounterProposals.
p ¬p
N A
NP Y
CP CP
Y NP
A N
¬(¬x) = x
¬(x ∧ y) = ¬x ∨ ¬y
Though not technically a De Morgan algebra, our lattice and negation operator do sat-
isfy the conditions. We provide proofs using an automated theorem prover.
4.3 Automated Theorem Proving
The algebraic properties of combinators based on the lattice structure are not only use-
ful for human reasoning and understanding, it also allows them to be formally analysed
using automated tools. This section describes initial experiences using automated theorem
provers on SCCs.
4.3.1 Prover9 and Mace4
Prover9 and Mace4 are a duo of programs that come bundled together and operate on
the same input. Prover9 is an automated theorem prover for first-order and equational logic,
while Mace4 searches for finite models and counterexamples [12]. The user supplies a set
of assumptions and a set of goals and either instructs Prover9 to find a proof or Mace4 to
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find a counterexample. The input format is such that the lattice axioms can be used almost
verbatim for the set of assumptions.
4.3.1.1 Input Format
Various options and declarations for custom operators are placed at the beginning of
the file:
% Language O p t i o n s
op ( 3 2 5 , p r e f i x , ” ˜ ” ) .
op ( 6 0 0 , i n f i x , ”==” ) .
i f ( P r o v e r 9 ) . % O p t i o n s f o r Prover9
a s s i g n ( max seconds , 120) .
e n d i f .
i f ( Mace4 ) . % O p t i o n s f o r Mace4
a s s i g n ( max seconds , 60) .
e n d i f .
The custom operators declared at the top are necessary for specifying the negation and
equality combinators later on. The max seconds options allow the user to limit how long
the programs will run before giving up.
Next after these options come the assumptions. First, we have the lattice axioms:
f o r m u l a s ( a s s u m p t i o n s ) .
% L a t t i c e Theory
x ˆ y = y ˆ x # l a b e l ( ” c o m m u t a t i v i t y m e e t ” ) .
x v y = y v x # l a b e l ( ” c o m m u t a t i v i t y j o i n ” ) .
( x ˆ y ) ˆ z = x ˆ ( y ˆ z ) # l a b e l ( ” a s s o c i a t i v i t y m e e t ” ) .
( x v y ) v z = x v ( y v z ) # l a b e l ( ” a s s o c i a t i v i t y j o i n ” ) .
( x v y ) ˆ x = x # l a b e l ( ” a b s o r p t i o n 1 ” ) .
30
( x ˆ y ) v x = x # l a b e l ( ” a b s o r p t i o n 2 ” ) .
% d e f i n e r e l a t i o n s
x <= y <−> x ˆ y = x # l a b e l ( ” l e s s t h a n e q u a l ” ) .
x < y <−> x <= y & x != y # l a b e l ( ” l e s s t h a n ” ) .
% SCC v o t e s
x v N = x # l a b e l ( ” j o i n i d e n t i t y ” ) .
x ˆ A = x # l a b e l ( ” m e e t i d e n t i t y ” ) .
N < NP .
Y < A.
N < x −> NP <= x # l a b e l ( ” a t o m i c e l e m e n t ” ) .
x < A −> x <= Y # l a b e l ( ” c o a t o m i c e l e m e n t ” ) .
% c o u n t e r p r o p o s a l s
CP ( x ) <−> −(x = Y |
x = NP |
x = A | x = N) # l a b e l ( ” c o u n t e r p r o p o s a l ” ) .
CP ( x ) & CP ( y ) & x != y
−> x ˆ y = NP & x v y = Y # l a b e l ( ” c p s n o n c o m p a r a b l e ” ) .
e x i s t s x ( CP ( x ) ) .
These look similar to the axioms already given. The designation of CounterProposal
is again a predicate.
Continuing with the set of assumptions, we define the basic combinators negation and
equality:
% n e g a t i o n
˜ ˜ x = x .
˜A = N.
˜N = A.
˜Y = NP .
˜NP = Y.
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CP ( x ) <−> ˜ x = x .
%e q u a l i t y
x = y <−> x == y = A.
x != y <−> x == y = N.
x == y = y == x .
e n d o f l i s t .
And thus ends the base list of assumptions. Additional sets of assumptions can be included
in separate files and used when the Prover9 or Mace4 programs are run from the command
line.
Using these assumptions, we are able to prove or disprove formulas based on our SCC
model. An example goal would be distributivity:
f o r m u l a s ( g o a l s ) .
( x v y ) ˆ z = ( x ˆ z ) v ( y ˆ z ) # l a b e l ( ” d i s t r i b u t i v i t y ” ) .
e n d o f l i s t .
Using Mace4 we could verify that distributivity does not hold by letting it find a coun-
terexample.
4.3.1.2 Experience and Results
If a counterexample exists, Mace4 will usually find it immediately. This was the case
for distributivity (result shown in the appendix). On the other hand, proofs are more diffi-
cult to find and Prover9 will often search for longer than 10 or 15 minutes without a result.
Because of this, more complex or general formulae must be broken down and proved gran-
ularly. The proof of De Morgan’s Law is an example of this. An attempt to prove the
general formula did not find a result within 30 minutes:
f o r m u l a s ( g o a l s ) .
˜ ( x ˆ y ) = ˜ x v ˜ y # l a b e l ( ” de morgan ’ s ” ) .
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e n d o f l i s t .
Before we could begin to prove De Morgan’s Law a second time, we started off at-
tempting to prove a relation:
x ≤ y ⇐⇒ ¬y ≤ ¬x
There is an intuitive sense that it is true: negated constants are in the same position but
on the opposite end of the lattice as the original constant, while counterproposals remain
stationary in the middle. Negating both variables is equivalent to rotating the lattice 180 de-
grees, which corresponds to rotating the variables around the≤ relation. Prover9, however,
does not have this intuitive sense and fails to find a proof in adequate time.
We add the relation as an assumption in order to help prove more intermediary formulas—
the general law is still too hard for Prover9 to prove directly. We use implication to break
the search up into to separate searches (e.g. checking if the law holds when x ≤ y or
x 6= y, etc.) and if the implications exhaustively cover all possible cases, then the law is
true in general. The cases we choose are x ≤ y, y ≤ x, and CP (x) & CP (y), which is
exhaustive because the only time two votes are not comparable using ≤ is when they are
both counterproposals.
The two separate goals we prove are for when the variables are comparable and when
they are non-comparable:
f o r m u l a s ( g o a l s ) .
x <= y | y <= x −> ˜ ( y v x ) = ˜ y ˆ ˜ x # l a b e l ( ” de morgan ’ s comparab le
” )
e n d o f l i s t .
f o r m u l a s ( g o a l s ) .
CP ( x ) & CP ( y ) −> ˜ ( y v x ) = ˜ y ˆ ˜ x # l a b e l ( ” de morgan ’ s non−
comparab le ” )
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e n d o f l i s t .
The proofs for these can be found in the appendix.
4.3.2 TPTP and E Prover
A second automated theorem prover, E Prover, was used to compare performance with
Prover9 and see if goals that could be proved in a reasonable time [15]. To make the
comparison easier, a tool that was included with Prover9 was used to convert Prover9 in-
puts into the TPTP format [17], which is a commonly implemented format for automated
theorem provers and is understood by E Prover. The converted inputs were then run on
E Prover. Overall, it fared no better on proving any of the goals that Prover9 also had
difficulty proving.
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CHAPTER 5
ANALYSIS OF COMBINATOR SIZE
The amount of space needed to express or implement SDCs and SCCs based on their
table representation will depend greatly on the arity of the combinator. As the number of
leaf policies increases, the amount of space required will also increase, though the growth is
not as easily described as that of functions from boolean or multi-valued logic. A boolean
function with an arity of k will have 2k rows in its table representation, with each row
corresponding to a permutation of input values. Similarly, functions of multi-valued logic
will have mk rows, where m is the number of truth-values in the logic. The number of
rows for an SDC will generally be less than a multi-valued function with the same number
of truth-values as it has input-values, due to the restricted labelling of counter proposals
within input permutations. The restriction causes some permutations to be invalid (e.g.
(CP2, CP1) or (CP2, CP2)), resulting in those rows being omitted from the SDC table.
Due to the restricted labelling of counter proposals, the problem of counting the rows
in an SCC table is closely related the problem of counting the ways a set can be partitioned.
Counter proposals are labelled from 1, ..., n based on their occurrence in the input sequence
and their distinctness from previous counter proposals. When counter proposals are given
the same label for being equivalent, it is as if they are placed into the same subset of
a partition of the input sequence. Looking at it this way, the label given to a counter
proposal is the position of the first counter proposal added to the subset. A similar system
for describing set partitions shows a correspondence with counter proposal labels.
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When a set is partitioned into disjoint subsets called blocks, each element is placed in
only one block. The mapping from elements to blocks can be represented using Restricted
Growth Strings (RGSs) [13]. If we restrict the domain of SCCs to counter proposals, the
permutations of input values are equivalent to RGSs. We describe the equivalence below.
RGSs always start with 1, since the first element will be placed in the first block. The
next element will either be in the first block, in which case the string will have another 1,
or in a new block, in which case the string will have a 2. Each successive element must be
placed in a previous block or in a new one, so the RGS will not ever have a number that
is larger than a previous number plus one. This is equivalent to our restriction on labelling
counter proposals, that a counter proposal is only labelled CPi+1 if it is not equal to the
previous CP1, ..., CPi.
Below are partitions of the set {a, b, c, d}, where a.bc.d is the partition {{a}, {b, c}, {d}}.
Each subset is written in increasing order of its elements, and the subsets are listed in in-
creasing order of their smallest element.
1 blocks : abcd
2 blocks : abc.d, abd.c, acd.b, a.bcd, ab.cd, ac.bd, ad.bc
3 blocks : a.b.cd, a.bd.c, a.bc.d, ad.b.c, ac.b.d, ab.c.d
4 blocks : a.b.c.d
The corresponding restricted growth strings for these partitions are:
1 blocks : 1111
2 blocks : 1112, 1121, 1211, 1222, 1122, 1212, 1221
3 blocks : 1233, 1232, 1223, 1231, 1213, 1123
4 blocks : 1234
The number in the nth position of the RGS indicates which block the nth element of
the set (given some ordering, e.g. alphabetical in the above case) is placed in. So for the
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partition acd.b, a, c, and d are in the first block and b is in the second block, resulting in an
RGS of 1211.
An RGS can formally be defined as a string a1, ..., an with a1 = 1 and
ai+1 ≤ 1 +max(a1, a2, ..., ai) (5.1)
for i = 1, 2, ..., n− 1.
Bell numbers and Stirling numbers are well known sequences in combinatorics that can
be used to count set partitions, and, accordingly, Restricted Growth Strings [13]. The same
RGSs can be used to describe both the table for an SDC of arity n that only accepts counter
proposals and the partitions of a set of n elements. The number of rows in the table and
the number of partitions of the set will both equal the Bell number Bn. Table 5.1 shows the
table representation of an SCC that corresponds to the previous set partition example.
Table 5.1. Input permutations for an SDC that only takes counter proposals. Numbers are
used instead of the full CPi notation to make the correspondence with RGSs more visible.
p1 p2 p3 p4
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 2
1 1 2 1
1 1 2 2
1 1 2 3
1 2 1 1
1 2 1 2
1 2 1 3
1 2 2 1
1 2 2 2
1 2 2 3
1 2 3 1
1 2 3 2
1 2 3 3
1 2 3 4
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Stirling numbers of the second kind count the number of partitions with k blocks, and
are given the notation 
n
k
 (5.2)
In the set partition example, there were partitions with 1, 2, 3, and 4 blocks. Summing the
number of partitions for each value of k will result in the Bell number for the set, or
n∑
k=0

n
k
 = Bn (5.3)
For an SCC, which also accept constants Y , N , NP , and A as inputs, the Bell numbers
no longer count the number of rows in its table, though a generalization of the Stirling num-
bers can be used to count them. The difference is that, unlike labelled counter proposals,
constants are not restricted in what position they may appear within a permutation, break-
ing the correspondence with RGSs where all characters are restricted. However, given an
RGS with a certain prefix, the characters in the prefix would appear unrestricted in the latter
portion of the string. If a set of RGSs were truncated after a common prefix, they would all
share a set of unrestricted characters that act as constants. r-Stirling numbers of the second
kind, a generalization of Stirling numbers of the second kind, can be used to ensure the
prefix of an RGS contains certain characters.
r-Stirling numbers of the second kind, as defined by Andrei [18], count the number of
ways to partition a set of n elements using partitions of size k, such that the first r elements
are in distinct subsets. They are given the notation:

n
k

r
(5.4)
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When the partitions counted by r-Stirling numbers of the second kind are represented
as RGSs, the first r characters of the string will always be 1, 2, ..., r, as each of the first
r elements must be in distinct subsets. Since elements are partitioned in order, they will
always be placed in the first r subsets. For example, if r = 2 the first two elements are
placed in the first two subsets so that they are separate, resulting in a prefix of 12 for the
RGS. The remaining n − r elements are partitioned as they would with standard Stirling
numbers of the second kind. Table 5.2 shows an example of restricted partitions.
Table 5.2. Restricted partitions of a set of four elements with corresponding RGSs, grouped
by the number of subsets. The first two elements must be in distinct subsets.
2-Stirling number Partition RGS
{
4
2
}
2
1.234 1222
13.24 1212
134.2 1211
14.23 1221
{
4
3
}
2
1.2.34 1233
1.23.4 1223
1.24.3 1232
13.2.4 1213
14.2.3 1231{
4
4
}
2
1.2.3.4 1234
In the portion of the string after the prefix, the numbers 1, ..., r will appear unrestricted,
akin to constant values that appear unrestricted in the input permutations for SCCs. Re-
stricting elements effectively makes them ”constants” in the sense of SDC values when
only considering the portion of the string that proceeds the prefix. The first r numbers will
appear unrestricted in the truncated string while the characters r + 1, ..., n will remain re-
stricted, though with r+1 behaving as the new first restricted number, allowing it to appear
as the first character of the string.
Numbers 1, ..., r in a truncated RGS can be mapped to constants and r+1, ..., nmapped
to counter proposals CP1, ...CPn−r. Table 5.3 shows the mapping.
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Table 5.3. The table shows the mapping between SDC input permutations and the high-
lighted portion of the RGSs.
N → 1
Y → 2
CP1 → 3
CP2 → 4
SCC input RGS
p1 p2
N N 1211
N Y 1212
N CP1 1213
Y N 1221
Y Y 1222
Y CP1 1223
CP1 N 1231
CP1 Y 1232
CP1 CP1 1233
CP1 CP2 1234
Theorem 5.1 For SDCs of arity n with r constant values and unlimited counter proposals
in their domain, the number of possible input permutations is equal to
n+r∑
k=r

n+ r
k

r
(5.5)
for n > 0. When n = 0, the number of input permutations is r.
Proof As was detailed in this chapter, there is a direct mapping between the permutations
of inputs for SDCs and the portion of RGSs after the prefix.
Permutations of SCC inputs may include constants (such as Y or N ) that appear any-
where within the ordering and counter proposals (CP1, CP2, ...) that are restricted in where
they can appear. A counter proposal labelled CPj cannot appear in a permutation before
CPi if j > i.
RGSs that represent restricted partitions counted by r-Stirling numbers of the second
kind will have a prefix that contains the characters 1, ..., r. In the portion of the RGS that
occurs after the prefix, these characters appear unrestricted, akin to constants that appear
unrestricted in input permutations of SDCs. Characters that do not appear in the prefix,
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r + 1, ..., r + n, are subject to the standard restriction where r + j cannot appear before
r + i in the string if j > i, which corresponds to the restriction on counter proposals.
So, for SCCs, which include Y , N , NP , and A as constants in their domain, r is set to
four.
Theorem 5.2 For SCCs with an arity of n, the number of possible input permutations, or
rows in their table definition, is equal to
n+4∑
k=4

n+ 4
k

4
(5.6)
for n > 0. When n = 0, the number of input permutations is 4.
Proof Theorem 5.2 is a special case of Theorem 5.1 with r set to four.
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CHAPTER 6
NUMBER OF POSSIBLE COMBINATORS
To get a sense of how large the space of combinators is and how it grows as the arity
increases, we can define a formula for calculating just how many exist. To determine this,
we can count how many distinct ways the input permutations, as enumerated in the previous
chapter, can be mapped onto results. Each mapping from the set of input permutations to
an output is a distinct combinator, or as they are referred to in logic, a truth function. With
logic and with combinators these mappings can be visualized as the columns in the truth
table, where each column represents a truth function. For example, boolean logic has 16
different binary operators, listed in the truth table below.
Table 6.1. The 16 boolean operators with an arity of 2.
p q 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1
1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
SDCs are a bit different because the domain and codomain grow with the arity, due to
the existence of counterproposals.
6.1 Counting Combinators
Counting SCC-like combinators is a special case of counting permutations that allow
repetition. For permutations with repetition, there are a number of items to choose from,
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a, and a number of choices to make, s, from which the total number of ways to make s
choices of a items is calculated by multiplying a× a× a× ... (s times) or as. For example,
the boolean operators in Table 6.1 have two return values to chose from (0 or 1), so a = 2.
A return value must be chosen for each permutation of inputs (00, 01, 10, and 11), so the
number of choices to make is four, or s = 4. This means there is a total of 24, or 16 ways
to make a boolean operator.
For combinators, with each assignment of input variables a “choice” must also be made
of what value the combinator will return, so s will equal the number of permutations of
input votes. The number of return values available to choose from, a, depends on if there
are counterproposals in the input (since counterproposals cannot be returned unless they
are present as an input value) and the number of constant votes in the environment, such as
Y , N , or A.
Table 6.2. A 2-ary combinator with a domain and codomain of {Y,N,CP1, CP2} has 10
possible variable assignments, each corresponding to a row (s = 10). Each row has a
number of values it can return.
p1 p2 i (row number) ai (number of available return values)
N N 1 2
N CP1 2 3
N Y 3 2
CP1 N 4 3
CP1 CP1 5 3
CP1 CP2 6 4
CP1 Y 7 3
Y N 8 2
Y CP1 9 3
Y Y 10 2
Because a depends on the row, it will not be the same number multiplied each time as
in the normal case of permutations with repetition where the total is always as. What works
for boolean operators will not work SDCs. Rather, for SDCs there is some value ai for each
row i ∈ 1, ..., s where ai is the number of result values available for row i. The equation to
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calculate the total number of permutations then becomes
a1 × a2 × ...× as (6.1)
There are still s numbers being multiplied, each representing a number of items avail-
able to choose from. From Table 6.2 we can determine equation 6.1 for 2-ary combinators
with a domain and codomain of {Y,N,CP1, CP2} to be 2×3×2×3×3×4×3×2×3×2,
which can be rewritten as
(24)(35)(41)
It is important to note that the exponents not only add up to s (the number of rows, or
“choices” to make) but that they correspond to r-Stirling numbers of the second kind. In
Chapter 5 it was demonstrated that the number of rows of a combinator’s truth table is equal
to the sum of the r-Stirling numbers of the second kind over the appropriate range, so this
is no coincidence. There is a connection between combinator input values and partitions
counted by r-Stirling numbers of the second kind that was not highlighted in the previous
chapter.
Recall that r-Stirling numbers of the second kind count the number of ways to partition
a set of size n into k subsets, such that the first r elements are in different subsets (referred
to as restricted partitions). Also recall that Restricted Growth Strings describe which sub-
set each element of the set is partitioned into, so an RGS of 1211 means the first element is
in the first partition, the second element is in the second partitions, and the third and fourth
elements are in the first partition. RGSs make the mapping between restricted partitions
and combinator input permutations more direct, as exemplified in Table 5.3, where each
row of the truth table has a corresponding RGS. Intuitively, the subsets of a restricted par-
tition correspond to the available values a combinator could return for the corresponding
row, with the first r subsets being mapped to constant values (Y , N , NP , etc.), and the re-
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maining subsets being mapped to counterproposals. Because they are restricted partitions,
there are always r separate subsets available for selection, just as for combinators there are
always r constants available as a return value.
To find the number of rows with a particular number of return values to choose from
(k, e.g. we are finding the rows i ∈ 1..s where ai = k) it follows we only need to find the
number of partitions with k subsets, which we can use the r-Stirling numbers of the second
kind to find. In general, the number of rows with k possible return values is

n+ r
k

r
Using the example from Table 6.2, we have 2 constant values Y and N (r = 2), and an
arity of 2 (n = 2), so to find how many rows have 2, 3, and 4 possible return values we can
use r-Stirling numbers of the second kind instead of counting by hand
2

4
2

2
3

4
3

2
4

4
4

2
 = (24)(35)(41)
When calculated, the r-Stirling numbers of the second kind give the same exponents that
were counted by hand.
So, for each row there are k values to choose from and the total number of permutations
for those rows is determined by multiplying k by itself

n+ r
k

r
times, or k

n+ r
k

r .
Since the number of available return values must be between r (only constants) and r + n
(constants and counter proposals) for each row, calculating k

n+ r
k

r for each value of k
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from r, ..., r + n and multiplying them together will give the total number of permutations
across all rows.
Theorem 6.1 The number of distinct SDCs of arity n with r constant values and unlimited
counter proposals in their domain is counted by
n+r∏
k=r
k

n+ r
k

r (6.2)
for n ≥ 0, r ≥ 0.
Proof SDCs map each permutation of input variable assignments to a result. Results are
limited to constants and values that occur as input values. s, the total number of rows,
choices must be made, and there are a1, ..., as items to choose from at each selection. The
total number of ways to make these selections is
a1 × a2 × ...× as
There are between r (just constants) and r + n (constants and counter proposals) return
values to choose from for each row, so
r ≤ ai ≤ r + n
for i ∈ {1, ..., s}. To calculate how many rows have k return values, we use the r-Stirling
number of the second kind,

n+ r
k

r
. Since all rows have a number of return values
between r and r + n, and we can calculate just how many rows do using r-Stirling number
of the second kind, we can arrive at the final formula by multiplication.
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Theorem 6.1 can be used to determine how many possible SCCs there are by setting
the number of constants to four.
Theorem 6.2 The number of distinct SCCs with an arity of n is counted by
n+4∏
k=4
k

n+ 4
k

4 (6.3)
for n ≥ 0.
Proof Theorem 6.2 is a special case of Theorem 6.1 where the number of constants, r, is
set to 4.
6.2 Calculating the Number of SCCs
We can use Theorem 6.2 to calculate just how many different SCCs a policy writer
could have available. To help with the calculations, some 4-restricted Stirling numbers of
the second kind are listed in Table 6.3.
Table 6.3. 4-restricted Stirling numbers of the second kind [1] appear as exponents in in-
stances of equation 6.3. The arity (n) of the combinator determines which row of integers
will appear as exponents, e.g. if the arity is 2, the row indexed by 6 is used because
2 + 4 = 6.
n+4 k 4 5 6 7 8 9
4 1
5 4 1
6 16 9 1
7 64 61 15 1
8 256 369 151 22 1
9 1024 2101 1275 305 30 1
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For an SCC with an arity of two (n = 2), Theorem 6.2 gives us the equation
6∏
k=4
k

6
k

4 =
4

6
4

4
5

6
5

4
6

6
6

4

Table 6.3 can be used to fill in the 4-restricted Stirling numbers of the second kind
(using the row where n+ 2 is 6 and k is 4, 5, and 6) that appear as exponents, producing a
simplified equation:
(416)(59)(61) = 5.0331648× 1016
Table 6.3 can be used again to produce the equation for SCCs with an arity of 3:
(464)(561)(615)(71) = 4.85709396× 1093
The number of possible combinators increases rapidly once the arity exceeds 1. The
table below compares the number of SCCs with the number of boolean, 4, and 5-valued
logic operators.
Table 6.4. The number of SCCs increases at a much greater rate with arity than boolean
or 4-valued logic functions. The disparity arises because the number of counter pro-
posals grows along with the arity, increasing the size of the domain and codomain for
SCCs. The rate of growth as a function of arity is on the order of O(nnn). The number
of SCCs with an arity of 4 has 550 digits in its decimal expansion, but can be written
((4256)(5369)(6151)(722)(81)).
Arity SCCs Boolean functs. 4-valued functs. 5-valued functs.
0 4 2 4 5
1 1280 4 256 3125
2 5.0331648× 1016 64 4294967296 2.98023224× 1017
3 4.85709396× 1093 256 464 2.3509887× 1087
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION
This paper proposes a general model for composing security policies for runtime en-
forcement mechanisms that are capable of emitting not only Yes and No, but arbitrary
system events. This chapter summarizes the contributions and describes possible exten-
sions to our model.
7.1 Summary
Static Decision Combinators provide a way to specify larger, complex policies from a
number of smaller, base subpolicies. This allows for modular development and reuse of
policy logic. Base policies are also abstract black-boxes so that combinators can be decou-
pled from the underlying implementation. We also provide a number of reusable general
purpose combinators, such as if-then-else, try-with, and dominates as well as blueprints for
constructing more unique ones, such as the majority and quorum combinators. The model
also has the advantage of being amendable to analysis, which we have shown by detailing
the algebraic properties of conjunction, disjunction, and negation combinators and showing
how properties about these combinators can be proved using automated tools. Finally, we
analyse the size of combinator truth tables and the breadth of combinators that exist.
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7.2 Extensions
We present a couple of extensions to the ideas of policy composition presented in this
thesis.
7.2.1 Tagged CounterProposals
CounterProposals are opaque to combinators, making it impossible to favor one
over another based on the impact of the event. It may be desirable to give combinators basic
knowledge on the nature of the event being proposed, which would allow policy authors to
create more expressive combinators statically.
The policy author could define a set of tags that would be used to label Counter-
Proposals. A policy would cast a CounterProposal vote with a tag and event
tuple: CP (tag, e). This would allow combinators to make different decisions based on
the tags of CounterProposals. This increased expressiveness would also cause the
size of the truth table definition to expand dramatically, depending on how many tags are
added. Each tag/event combination would be a possible input, rather than just events as
counterproposals.
7.2.2 Combination Algebra
Another possible interpretation of the negation combinator leads to a boolean algebra
for composing policy decisions. In our interpretation, the negation of a counterproposal
returns the same counterproposal. The algebraic model might define a dual vote to counter-
proposals, which we label CP (e). The meaning of the dual is “as long is the event is not e,
I do not care”. Naturally, the conjunction of CP (e) and CP (e) is No, since they directly
conflict. By their dual nature the disjunction would be Abstain.
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The algebraic nature arises if we think about the values as sets, with a counterproposal
being a set of just one event {e}, and the dual being the set of all possible votes excluding
e. We can continue to write CP (e) as a shorthand to avoid writing an unbounded number
of events (with the knowledge that the actual number of counterproposals during a query is
limited by the number of subpolicies a policy has). In this interpretation, conjunction and
disjunction become intersection and union on sets. It follows that No is actually the empty
set and Abstain is the set of all possible votes. Each vote is essentially a set of all the
outcomes the policy is okay with in response to the incoming proposal.
The vote of Yes in this model would essentially be the same as a counterproposal,
except the event in its set is the incoming proposal. The dual of Yes in this case would not
be the empty set No but rather the set of all events that are not the incoming proposal. This
is similar to throwing an exception, which indicates the current proposal is invalid but does
not preclude the insertion of counterproposals.
With every vote having a dual, conjunction, disjunction and negation combinators be-
come operators in a boolean algebra, allowing for additional properties such as distributiv-
ity and De Morgan’s Law to hold.
If the vote at the top of the policy does not include the incoming proposal, it would be
interpreted as an exception and if it were the empty set, the system would halt because there
were no valid events. However, this system would introduce additional issues to resolve,
such as what to do when multiple counterposals reach the top. It may be reasonable so
choose the first since all are deemed valid.
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Appendix A SCC Definitions
The complete truth tables for the combinators introduced in previous chapters are dis-
played here.
Table A.1. Standard conjunction.
∧ N NP CP1 CP2 Y A
N N N N N N N
NP N NP NP NP NP NP
CP1 N NP CP1 NP CP1 CP1
Y N NP CP1 CP2 Y Y
A N NP CP1 CP2 Y A
Table A.2. Standard disjunction.
∨ N NP CP1 CP2 Y A
N N NP CP1 CP2 Y A
NP NP NP CP1 CP2 Y A
CP1 CP1 CP1 CP1 Y Y A
Y Y Y Y Y Y A
A A A A A A A
Table A.3. Equality.
= N NP CP1 CP2 Y A
N A N N N N N
NP N A N N N N
CP1 N N A N N N
Y N N N N A N
A N N N N N A
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Appendix A (Continued)
Table A.4. Inequality.
6= N NP CP1 CP2 Y A
N N A A A A A
NP A N A A A A
CP1 A A N A A A
Y A A A A N A
A A A A A A N
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Appendix A (Continued)
Table A.5. if-then-else
p2 p3
p1 N NP CP1 Y A
N N N N N N N
N NP NP NP NP N N
N CP1 CP1 CP1 CP1 N N
N CP2 CP2 CP2 CP2 N N
N Y Y Y Y N N
N A A A A N N
NP N N N N NP NP
NP NP NP NP NP NP NP
NP CP1 CP1 CP1 CP1 NP NP
NP CP2 CP2 CP2 CP2 NP NP
NP Y Y Y Y NP NP
NP A A A A NP NP
CP1 N N N N CP1 CP1
CP1 NP NP NP NP CP1 CP1
CP1 CP1 CP1 CP1 CP1 CP1 CP1
CP1 CP2 CP2 CP2 CP2 CP1 CP1
CP1 Y Y Y Y CP1 CP1
CP1 A A A A CP1 CP1
CP2 N N N N CP2 CP2
CP2 NP NP NP NP CP2 CP2
CP2 CP1 CP1 CP1 CP1 CP2 CP2
CP2 CP2 CP2 CP2 CP2 CP2 CP2
CP2 CP3 CP3 CP3 CP3 CP2 CP2
CP2 Y Y Y Y CP2 CP2
CP2 A A A A CP2 CP2
Y N N N N Y Y
Y NP NP NP NP Y Y
Y CP1 CP1 CP1 CP1 Y Y
Y CP2 CP2 CP2 CP2 Y Y
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Y A A A A Y Y
A N N N N A A
A NP NP NP NP A A
A CP1 CP1 CP1 CP1 A A
A CP2 CP2 CP2 CP2 A A
A Y Y Y Y A A
A A A A A A A
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Appendix B Prover9 and Mace4 Inputs and Proofs
The main input file scc.in:
% Language O p t i o n s
op ( 3 2 5 , p r e f i x , ” ˜ ” ) .
op ( 6 0 0 , i n f i x , ”==” ) .
i f ( P r o v e r 9 ) . % O p t i o n s f o r Prover9
a s s i g n ( max seconds , 120) .
e n d i f .
i f ( Mace4 ) . % O p t i o n s f o r Mace4
a s s i g n ( max seconds , 60) .
e n d i f .
f o r m u l a s ( a s s u m p t i o n s ) .
% L a t t i c e Theory
x ˆ y = y ˆ x # l a b e l ( ” c o m m u t a t i v i t y m e e t ” ) .
x v y = y v x # l a b e l ( ” c o m m u t a t i v i t y j o i n ” ) .
( x ˆ y ) ˆ z = x ˆ ( y ˆ z ) # l a b e l ( ” a s s o c i a t i v i t y m e e t ” ) .
( x v y ) v z = x v ( y v z ) # l a b e l ( ” a s s o c i a t i v i t y j o i n ” ) .
( x v y ) ˆ x = x # l a b e l ( ” a b s o r p t i o n 1 ” ) .
( x ˆ y ) v x = x # l a b e l ( ” a b s o r p t i o n 2 ” ) .
% d e f i n e r e l a t i o n s
x <= y <−> x ˆ y = x # l a b e l ( ” l e s s t h a n e q u a l ” ) .
x < y <−> x <= y & x != y # l a b e l ( ” l e s s t h a n ” ) .
% SCC v o t e s
x v N = x # l a b e l ( ” j o i n i d e n t i t y ” ) .
x ˆ A = x # l a b e l ( ” m e e t i d e n t i t y ” ) .
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Appendix B (Continued)
N < NP .
Y < A.
N < x −> NP <= x # l a b e l ( ” a t o m i c e l e m e n t ” ) .
x < A −> x <= Y # l a b e l ( ” c o a t o m i c e l e m e n t ” ) .
% c o u n t e r p r o p o s a l s
CP ( x ) <−> −(x = Y
| x = NP |
x = A |
x = N) # l a b e l ( ” c o u n t e r p r o p o s a l ” ) .
CP ( x ) & CP ( y ) & x != y
−> x ˆ y = NP & x v y = Y # l a b e l ( ” c p s n o n c o m p a r a b l e ” ) .
e x i s t s x ( CP ( x ) ) .
% n e g a t i o n
˜ ˜ x = x .
˜A = N.
˜N = A.
˜Y = NP .
˜NP = Y.
CP ( x ) <−> ˜ x = x .
x = y <−> x == y = A.
x != y <−> x == y = N.
x == y = y == x .
e n d o f l i s t .
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B.1 Proofs
Proofs include the goal, additional assumptions, and the proof or counterexample that
was found.
B.1.1 Distributivity Counterexample
A disproof of distributivity was found using Mace4. The goal as it was input:
f o r m u l a s ( g o a l s ) .
( x v y ) ˆ z = ( x ˆ z ) v ( y ˆ z ) # l a b e l ( ” d i s t r i b u t i v i t y ” ) .
e n d o f l i s t .
The model found as a counterexample:
% number = 1
% s e c o n d s = 0
% I n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f s i z e 7
== :
| 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
−−−+−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
0 | 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 | 1 0 1 1 1 1 1
2 | 1 1 0 1 1 1 1
3 | 1 1 1 0 1 1 1
4 | 1 1 1 1 0 1 1
5 | 1 1 1 1 1 0 1
6 | 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
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< :
| 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
−−−+−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
0 | 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 | 1 0 1 1 1 1 1
2 | 1 0 0 1 1 1 1
3 | 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 | 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
5 | 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
6 | 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
<= :
| 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
−−−+−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
0 | 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 | 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2 | 1 0 1 1 1 1 1
3 | 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
4 | 1 0 0 1 1 0 0
5 | 1 0 0 1 0 1 0
6 | 1 0 0 1 0 0 1
ˆ :
| 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
−−−+−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
0 | 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 | 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2 | 2 1 2 2 2 2 2
3 | 3 1 2 3 4 5 6
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4 | 4 1 2 4 4 2 2
5 | 5 1 2 5 2 5 2
6 | 6 1 2 6 2 2 6
v :
| 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
−−−+−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
0 | 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 | 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
2 | 0 2 2 3 4 5 6
3 | 0 3 3 3 3 3 3
4 | 0 4 4 3 4 3 3
5 | 0 5 5 3 3 5 3
6 | 0 6 6 3 3 3 6
A : 0
N : 1
NP : 2
Y : 3
c1 : 4
c2 : 4
c3 : 5
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c4 : 6
˜ :
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
1 0 3 2 4 5 6
CP :
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
0 0 0 0 1 1 1
The result shows that if there are three different counterproposals, the meet and join
SCCs will not distribute.
B.1.2 De Morgan’s Law
Two goals are used to prove De Morgan’s Law. The proofs for each goal are listed
below. Each proof used an additional assumption:
f o r m u l a s ( a s s u m p t i o n s ) .
x <= y <−> ˜ y <= ˜ x .
e n d o f l i s t .
The first goal is for non-comparable votes (CounterProposals):
f o r m u l a s ( g o a l s ) .
CP ( x ) & CP ( y ) −> ( ˜ ( x v y ) = ˜ x ˆ ˜ y ) # l a b e l ( ” de morgan ’ s ” ) .
e n d o f l i s t .
The proof:
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% −−−−−−−− Comments from o r i g i n a l p r o o f −−−−−−−−
% Proo f 1 a t 5 . 1 6 (+ 0 . 3 2 ) s e c o n d s .
% Leng th o f p r o o f i s 3 7 .
% L e v e l o f p r o o f i s 9 .
% Maximum c l a u s e w e i g h t i s 1 2 .
% Given c l a u s e s 1595 .
1 x <= y <−> x ˆ y = x # l a b e l ( n o n c l a u s e ) . [ a s s u m p t i o n ] .
5 CP ( x ) <−> −(x = Y | x = NP | x = A | x = N) # l a b e l ( ” c o u n t e r p r o p o s a l ”
) # l a b e l ( n o n c l a u s e ) . [ a s s u m p t i o n ] .
6 CP ( x ) & CP ( y ) & x != y −> x ˆ y = NP & x v y = Y # l a b e l ( n o n c l a u s e ) .
[ a s s u m p t i o n ] .
8 CP ( x ) <−> ˜ x = x # l a b e l ( n o n c l a u s e ) . [ a s s u m p t i o n ] .
13 CP ( x ) & CP ( y ) −> ( x <= y <−> ˜ y <= ˜ x ) # l a b e l ( n o n c l a u s e ) # l a b e l (
g o a l ) . [ g o a l ] .
14 x ˆ y = y ˆ x # l a b e l ( ” c o m m u t a t i v i t y m e e t ” ) . [ a s s u m p t i o n ] .
15 x v y = y v x # l a b e l ( ” c o m m u t a t i v i t y j o i n ” ) . [ a s s u m p t i o n ] .
18 ( x v y ) ˆ x = x # l a b e l ( ” a b s o r p t i o n 1 ” ) . [ a s s u m p t i o n ] .
19 x ˆ ( x v y ) = x . [ copy ( 1 8 ) , r e w r i t e ( [ 1 4 ( 2 ) ] ) ] .
20 ( x ˆ y ) v x = x # l a b e l ( ” a b s o r p t i o n 2 ” ) . [ a s s u m p t i o n ] .
21 x v ( x ˆ y ) = x . [ copy ( 2 0 ) , r e w r i t e ( [ 1 5 ( 2 ) ] ) ] .
22 −(x <= y ) | x ˆ y = x . [ c l a u s i f y ( 1 ) ] .
23 x <= y | x ˆ y != x . [ c l a u s i f y ( 1 ) ] .
34 −CP ( x ) | NP != x # l a b e l ( ” c o u n t e r p r o p o s a l ” ) . [ c l a u s i f y ( 5 ) ] .
38 −CP ( x ) | −CP ( y ) | y = x | x ˆ y = NP . [ c l a u s i f y ( 6 ) ] .
46 −CP ( x ) | ˜ x = x . [ c l a u s i f y ( 8 ) ] .
54 CP ( c2 ) . [ deny ( 1 3 ) ] .
55 CP ( c3 ) . [ deny ( 1 3 ) ] .
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56 c2 <= c3 | ˜ c3 <= ˜ c2 . [ deny ( 1 3 ) ] .
57 −(c2 <= c3 ) | −(˜ c3 <= ˜ c2 ) . [ deny ( 1 3 ) ] .
70 x ˆ x = x . [ p a r a ( 2 1 ( a , 1 ) , 1 9 ( a , 1 , 2 ) ) ] .
129 ˜ c2 = c2 . [ r e s o l v e ( 5 4 , a , 4 6 , a ) ] .
132 −CP ( x ) | c2 = x | x ˆ c2 = NP . [ r e s o l v e ( 5 4 , a , 3 8 , b ) ] .
136 c2 != NP . [ r e s o l v e ( 5 4 , a , 3 4 , a ) , f l i p ( a ) ] .
138 −(c2 <= c3 ) | −(˜ c3 <= c2 ) . [ b a c k r e w r i t e ( 5 7 ) , r e w r i t e ( [ 1 2 9 ( 7 ) ] ) ] .
139 c2 <= c3 | ˜ c3 <= c2 . [ b a c k r e w r i t e ( 5 6 ) , r e w r i t e ( [ 1 2 9 ( 7 ) ] ) ] .
140 ˜ c3 = c3 . [ r e s o l v e ( 5 5 , a , 4 6 , a ) ] .
147 c3 != NP . [ r e s o l v e ( 5 5 , a , 3 4 , a ) , f l i p ( a ) ] .
149 c2 <= c3 | c3 <= c2 . [ b a c k r e w r i t e ( 1 3 9 ) , r e w r i t e ( [ 1 4 0 ( 5 ) ] ) ] .
150 −(c2 <= c3 ) | −(c3 <= c2 ) . [ b a c k r e w r i t e ( 1 3 8 ) , r e w r i t e ( [ 1 4 0 ( 5 ) ] ) ] .
162 x <= x . [ r e s o l v e ( 7 0 , a , 2 3 , b ) ] .
249 c2 <= c3 | c2 ˆ c3 = c3 . [ r e s o l v e ( 1 4 9 , b , 2 2 , a ) , r e w r i t e ( [ 1 4 ( 6 ) ] ) ] .
468 c2 ˆ c3 = c3 | c2 ˆ c3 = c2 . [ r e s o l v e ( 2 4 9 , a , 2 2 , a ) ] .
3354 c3 = c2 | c2 ˆ c3 = NP . [ r e s o l v e ( 1 3 2 , a , 5 5 , a ) , r e w r i t e ( [ 1 4 ( 6 ) ] ) , f l i p
( a ) ] .
24692 c2 ˆ c3 = c2 | c3 = c2 . [ p a r a ( 4 6 8 ( a , 1 ) , 3 3 5 4 ( b , 1 ) ) , u n i t d e l ( c , 1 4 7 )
] .
24786 c3 = c2 . [ p a r a ( 2 4 6 9 2 ( a , 1 ) , 3 3 5 4 ( b , 1 ) ) , merge ( b ) , u n i t d e l ( b , 1 3 6 ) ] .
24787 $F . [ b a c k r e w r i t e ( 1 5 0 ) , r e w r i t e ( [ 2 4 7 8 6 ( 2 ) , 2 4 7 8 6 ( 4 ) ] ) , merge ( b ) ,
u n i t d e l ( a , 1 6 2 ) ] .
The second goal, for comparable votes:
f o r m u l a s ( g o a l s ) .
x <= y | y <= x −> ( ˜ ( x v y ) = ˜ x ˆ ˜ y ) # l a b e l ( ” de morgan ’ s ” ) .
e n d o f l i s t .
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The proof:
% −−−−−−−− Comments from o r i g i n a l p r o o f −−−−−−−−
% Proo f 1 a t 34 .39 (+ 2 . 3 9 ) s e c o n d s .
% Leng th o f p r o o f i s 5 8 .
% L e v e l o f p r o o f i s 9 .
% Maximum c l a u s e w e i g h t i s 1 2 .
% Given c l a u s e s 6403 .
1 x <= y <−> x ˆ y = x # l a b e l ( ” l e s s t h a n e q u a l ” ) # l a b e l ( n o n c l a u s e ) .
[ a s s u m p t i o n ] .
2 x < y <−> x <= y & x != y # l a b e l ( ” l e s s t h a n ” ) # l a b e l ( n o n c l a u s e ) . [
a s s u m p t i o n ] .
5 CP ( x ) <−> −(x = Y | x = NP | x = A | x = N) # l a b e l ( ” c o u n t e r p r o p o s a l ”
) # l a b e l ( n o n c l a u s e ) . [ a s s u m p t i o n ] .
8 CP ( x ) <−> ˜ x = x # l a b e l ( n o n c l a u s e ) . [ a s s u m p t i o n ] .
9 x = y <−> x == y = A # l a b e l ( n o n c l a u s e ) . [ a s s u m p t i o n ] .
10 x != y <−> x == y = N # l a b e l ( n o n c l a u s e ) . [ a s s u m p t i o n ] .
11 x <= y <−> ˜ y <= ˜ x # l a b e l ( n o n c l a u s e ) . [ a s s u m p t i o n ] .
12 x <= y | y <= x −> ˜ ( x v y ) = ˜ x ˆ ˜ y # l a b e l ( ” de morgan ’ s ” ) #
l a b e l ( n o n c l a u s e ) # l a b e l ( g o a l ) . [ g o a l ] .
13 x ˆ y = y ˆ x # l a b e l ( ” c o m m u t a t i v i t y m e e t ” ) . [ a s s u m p t i o n ] .
14 x v y = y v x # l a b e l ( ” c o m m u t a t i v i t y j o i n ” ) . [ a s s u m p t i o n ] .
17 ( x v y ) ˆ x = x # l a b e l ( ” a b s o r p t i o n 1 ” ) . [ a s s u m p t i o n ] .
18 x ˆ ( x v y ) = x . [ copy ( 1 7 ) , r e w r i t e ( [ 1 3 ( 2 ) ] ) ] .
19 ( x ˆ y ) v x = x # l a b e l ( ” a b s o r p t i o n 2 ” ) . [ a s s u m p t i o n ] .
20 x v ( x ˆ y ) = x . [ copy ( 1 9 ) , r e w r i t e ( [ 1 4 ( 2 ) ] ) ] .
21 −(x <= y ) | x ˆ y = x # l a b e l ( ” l e s s t h a n e q u a l ” ) . [ c l a u s i f y ( 1 ) ] .
22 x <= y | x ˆ y != x # l a b e l ( ” l e s s t h a n e q u a l ” ) . [ c l a u s i f y ( 1 ) ] .
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24 −(x < y ) | y != x # l a b e l ( ” l e s s t h a n ” ) . [ c l a u s i f y ( 2 ) ] .
25 x < y | −(x <= y ) | y = x # l a b e l ( ” l e s s t h a n ” ) . [ c l a u s i f y ( 2 ) ] .
27 x ˆ A = x # l a b e l ( ” m e e t i d e n t i t y ” ) . [ a s s u m p t i o n ] .
34 −CP ( x ) | A != x # l a b e l ( ” c o u n t e r p r o p o s a l ” ) . [ c l a u s i f y ( 5 ) ] .
40 ˜ ˜ x = x . [ a s s u m p t i o n ] .
41 ˜ A = N. [ a s s u m p t i o n ] .
42 ˜ N = A. [ a s s u m p t i o n ] .
46 CP ( x ) | ˜ x != x . [ c l a u s i f y ( 8 ) ] .
47 x != y | y == x = A. [ c l a u s i f y ( 9 ) ] .
49 x = y | y == x = N. [ c l a u s i f y ( 1 0 ) ] .
51 x == y = y == x . [ a s s u m p t i o n ] .
52 −(x <= y ) | ˜ y <= ˜ x . [ c l a u s i f y ( 1 1 ) ] .
53 x <= y | −(˜ y <= ˜ x ) . [ c l a u s i f y ( 1 1 ) ] .
54 c2 <= c3 | c3 <= c2 # l a b e l ( ” de morgan ’ s ” ) . [ deny ( 1 2 ) ] .
55 ˜ ( c2 v c3 ) != ˜ c2 ˆ ˜ c3 # l a b e l ( ” de morgan ’ s ” ) . [ deny ( 1 2 ) ] .
60 x ˆ ( y v x ) = x . [ p a r a ( 1 4 ( a , 1 ) , 1 8 ( a , 1 , 2 ) ) ] .
64 x v ( y ˆ x ) = x . [ p a r a ( 1 3 ( a , 1 ) , 2 0 ( a , 1 , 2 ) ) ] .
68 x ˆ x = x . [ p a r a ( 2 0 ( a , 1 ) , 1 8 ( a , 1 , 2 ) ) ] .
77 x <= A. [ r e s o l v e ( 2 7 , a , 2 2 , b ) ] .
86 −CP (A) . [ u r ( 3 4 , b , 2 7 , a ( f l i p ) ) , r e w r i t e ( [ 6 8 ( 3 ) ] ) ] .
105 N != A. [ p a r a ( 4 1 ( a , 1 ) , 4 6 ( b , 1 ) ) , u n i t d e l ( a , 8 6 ) ] .
111 x == x = A. [ r e s o l v e ( 4 7 , a , 4 0 , a ) , r e w r i t e ( [ 4 0 ( 2 ) ] ) ] .
116 −(x == y < y == x ) . [ u r ( 2 4 , b , 5 1 , a ) ] .
124 N <= x . [ p a r a ( 4 2 ( a , 1 ) , 5 3 ( b , 2 ) ) , u n i t d e l ( b , 7 7 ) ] .
131 c2 <= c3 | c2 ˆ c3 = c3 . [ r e s o l v e ( 5 4 , b , 2 1 , a ) , r e w r i t e ( [ 1 3 ( 6 ) ] ) ] .
139 N < x | N = x . [ r e s o l v e ( 1 2 4 , a , 2 5 , b ) , f l i p ( b ) ] .
157 x <= y v x . [ r e s o l v e ( 6 0 , a , 2 2 , b ) ] .
184 ˜ ( x v y ) <= ˜ y . [ r e s o l v e ( 1 5 7 , a , 5 2 , a ) ] .
187 x ˆ y <= x . [ p a r a ( 2 0 ( a , 1 ) , 1 5 7 ( a , 2 ) ) ] .
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203 x ˆ y <= y . [ p a r a ( 1 3 ( a , 1 ) , 1 8 7 ( a , 1 ) ) ] .
206 ˜ x <= ˜ ( y ˆ x ) . [ r e s o l v e ( 2 0 3 , a , 5 2 , a ) ] .
226 x = y | −(N < x == y ) . [ p a r a ( 4 9 ( b , 1 ) , 1 1 6 ( a , 1 ) ) ] .
611 ˜ x ˆ ˜ ( y v x ) = ˜ ( y v x ) . [ r e s o l v e ( 1 8 4 , a , 2 1 , a ) , r e w r i t e ( [ 1 3 ( 4 ) ] )
] .
753 ˜ x ˆ ˜ ( y ˆ x ) = ˜ x . [ r e s o l v e ( 2 0 6 , a , 2 1 , a ) ] .
956 c2 ˆ c3 = c3 | c2 ˆ c3 = c2 . [ r e s o l v e ( 1 3 1 , a , 2 1 , a ) ] .
1278 −(N < ˜ c2 ˆ ˜ c3 == ˜ ( c2 v c3 ) ) . [ u r ( 2 2 6 , a , 5 5 , a ) , r e w r i t e ( [ 5 1 ( 1 1 )
] ) ] .
1761 ˜ c2 ˆ ˜ c3 == ˜ ( c2 v c3 ) = N. [ r e s o l v e ( 1 2 7 8 , a , 1 3 9 , a ) , f l i p ( a ) ] .
24532 c2 ˆ c3 = c2 | c2 v c3 = c2 . [ p a r a ( 9 5 6 ( a , 1 ) , 2 0 ( a , 1 , 2 ) ) ] .
31954 c2 ˆ c3 = c2 . [ p a r a ( 2 4 5 3 2 ( b , 1 ) , 6 1 1 ( a , 1 , 2 , 1 ) ) , r e w r i t e ( [ 1 3 ( 1 0 ) ] ) ,
f l i p ( b ) , u n i t d e l ( b , 5 5 ) ] .
31964 c2 v c3 = c3 . [ p a r a ( 3 1 9 5 4 ( a , 1 ) , 6 4 ( a , 1 , 2 ) ) , r e w r i t e ( [ 1 4 ( 3 ) ] ) ] .
32032 ˜ c2 ˆ ˜ c3 = ˜ c3 . [ p a r a ( 3 1 9 5 4 ( a , 1 ) , 7 5 3 ( a , 1 , 2 , 1 ) ) , r e w r i t e ( [ 1 3 ( 5 )
] ) ] .
32131 $F . [ b a c k r e w r i t e ( 1 7 6 1 ) , r e w r i t e ( [ 3 2 0 3 2 ( 5 ) , 3 1 9 6 4 ( 5 ) , 1 1 1 ( 5 ) ] ) , f l i p (
a ) , u n i t d e l ( a , 1 0 5 ) ] .
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